Individual and Collective Choice and Voting in Common Pool Resource Problem with Heterogeneous Actors

Magdalena Margreiter (), Matthias Sutter () and Dennis Alexis Valin Dittrich ()

Environmental & Resource Economics, 2005, vol. 32, issue 2, pages 241-271

Abstract: In this paper we investigate the effects of heterogeneity in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We examine whether heterogeneity impedes or facilitates coordination on an efficient use of a CPR by proposing and voting on allocation schemes. In a full information design we compare extractions and voting behavior in heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. If the CPR is extracted individually, we find no difference in efficiency between heterogeneous and homogeneous groups. However, when groups can vote on allocation schemes, homogeneous groups are more likely to reach an efficient agreement than heterogeneous groups. Copyright Springer 2005

Keywords: common pool resources; experiment; heterogeneity; voting; C91; C92; D70; D74; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-005-3359-9 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:enreec:v:32:y:2005:i:2:p:241-271

Access Statistics for this article

Environmental & Resource Economics is edited by I.J. Bateman and R.K. Turner

More articles in Environmental & Resource Economics from European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().