Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: an experimental study

Antonio Cabrales (), Rosemarie Nagel () and Roc Armenter ()

Experimental Economics, 2007, vol. 10, issue 3, pages 221-234

Keywords: Global games; Risk dominance; Equilibrium selection; Common knowledge; C72; C91; C92; D82; G10; G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Equilibrium Selection through Incomplete Information in Coordination Games: An Experimental Study (2002)
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