When and why? A critical survey on coordination failure in the laboratory

Giovanna Maria Devetag and Andreas Ortmann ()

Experimental Economics, 2007, vol. 10, issue 3, pages 331-344

Keywords: Coordination games; Pareto-ranked equilibria; Payoff-asymmetric equilibria; Stag-hunt games; Optimization incentives; Robustness; Coordination; Coordination failure; C72; C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory (2006)
Working Paper: When and Why? A Critical Survey on Coordination Failure in the Laboratory (2006)
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