How Robust is Laboratory Gift Exchange?

Gary Charness (), Guillaume R. Frechette and John Kagel ()

Experimental Economics, 2004, vol. 7, issue 2, pages 189-205

Abstract: The gift-exchange game is a form of sequential prisoner's dilemma, developed by Fehr et al. (1993), and popularized in a series of papers by Ernst Fehr and co-authors. While the European studies typically feature a high degree of gift exchange, the few U.S. studies provide some conflicting results. We find that the degree of gift exchange is surprisingly sensitive to an apparently innocuous change--whether or not a comprehensive payoff table is provided in the instructions. We also find significant and substantial time trends in responder behavior.

Date: 2004
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