The value of reputation on eBay: A controlled experiment

Paul Resnick, Richard Zeckhauser (), John Swanson and Kate Lockwood

Experimental Economics, 2006, vol. 9, issue 2, pages 79-101

Abstract: We conducted the first randomized controlled field experiment of an Internet reputation mechanism. A high-reputation, established eBay dealer sold matched pairs of lots—batches of vintage postcards—under his regular identity and under new seller identities (also operated by him). As predicted, the established identity fared better. The difference in buyers’ willingness-to-pay was 8.1% of the selling price. A subsidiary experiment followed the same format, but compared sales by relatively new sellers with and without negative feedback. Surprisingly, one or two negative feedbacks for our new sellers did not affect buyers’ willingness-to-pay. Copyright Economic Science Association 2006

Keywords: Field experiment; eBay; Reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10683-006-4309-2 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:expeco:v:9:y:2006:i:2:p:79-101

Access Statistics for this article

Experimental Economics is edited by Jordi Brandts and Timothy Cason

More articles in Experimental Economics from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().