Candidate quality

Panu Poutvaara and Tuomas Takalo

International Tax and Public Finance, 2007, vol. 14, issue 1, pages 7-27

Abstract: We analyze the topical question of how the compensation of elected politicians affects the set of citizens choosing to run. To this end, we develop a sparse and tractable citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with ability differences, informative campaigning and political parties. Our results suggest that primaries, campaign costs and rewards have previously overlooked interactions that should be studied in a unified framework. Surprisingly, increasing the reward may lower the average candidate quality when the campaigning costs are sufficiently high. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Politicians’ competence; Career concerns; Campaigning costs; Rewards for elected officials; Citizen-candidate models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: Candidate Quality (2003)
Working Paper: Candidate Quality (2004)
Working Paper: Candidate Quality (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:14:y:2007:i:1:p:7-27

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