Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection
Takanori Ida and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Masahito Ambashi
Journal of Economics, 2008, vol. 93, issue 1, pages 1-29
Keywords: vertical separation; regulatory reform; intermediate institution; adverse selection; collusion; L33; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:93:y:2008:i:1:p:1-29
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