Analysis of vertical separation of regulators under adverse selection

Takanori Ida and M. Anbashi

Journal of Economics, 2008, vol. 93, issue 1, pages 1-29

Keywords: vertical separation; regulatory reform; intermediate institution; adverse selection; collusion; L33; L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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