Evidence of Information Asymmetries in the Market for Residential Condominiums

Ronald Rutherford, Thomas Springer and Abdullah Yavas ()

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2007, vol. 35, issue 1, pages 23-38

Abstract: Previous research (Rutherford et al. 2005; Levitt and Syverson 2005) identify and quantify agency problems in the brokerage of single-family houses. Real estate agents are found to receive a premium when selling their own houses in comparison to similar client-owned houses. Given the homogeneity of the condominium market in comparison to the single-family house market, we use a large sample of condominium transactions to examine if agency problems exist in the condominium market. Controlling for sample selection and endogeneity bias of the data, we find evidence for a similar price premium for agent-owned condominiums. In contrast to the results for single-family houses in the same geographic market, we find that agent-owned condominiums must stay on the market longer to receive a higher price. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Real estate agents; Condominium market; Single-family house market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:35:y:2007:i:1:p:23-38

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