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Public Choice
1978 - 2013
Edited by WIlliam F. Shughart
from Springer
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Volume 93, issue 3-4 , 1997
Majority Rule and the Public Provision of a Private Good pp. 221-44 Miguel Gouveia The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers pp. 245-70 Jeffrey Milyo Committee Characteristics and Re-election Margins: An Empirical Investigation of the US House pp. 271-85 W. Mark Crain and John T Sullivan Rhetoric and Rationality: A Study of Democratization in the Soviet Union pp. 287-314 Anderson, Richard D, and Bernard Grofman An Analysis of Voter Predictive Dimensions and Recovery of the Underlying Issue Space pp. 315-34 Tom Tanner Club Theory: Thirty Years Later pp. 335-55 Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A Public Choice Analysis of Turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives pp. 357-71 Mixon, Franklin G, and Kamal Upadhyaya A Comparison of Rent-Seeking Models and Economic Models of Conflict pp. 373-88 Hugh M Neary Self-Imposed Term Limits pp. 389-94 Edward Ludwig Glaeser The European Central Bank: Independence, Accountability and Strategy: A Review pp. 395-426 Jakob de Haan The Bundesbank's Path to Independence: Evidence from the 1950s pp. 427-53 Helge Berger Cooperative Lobbying and Endogenous Trade Policy pp. 455-75 Toke S Aidt Tullock's Rent-Seeking Contest with a Minimum Expenditure Requirement pp. 477-86 Lambert Schoonbeek and Peter Kooreman Who Wants the Euro--And Why? Economic Explanations of Public Attitudes towards a Single European Currency pp. 487-510 Manfred Gärtner Volume 93, issue 3 , 1997
Majority rule and the public provision of a private good pp. 221-244 Miguel Gouveia The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers pp. 245-270 Jeffrey Milyo Committee characteristics and re-election margins: An empirical investigation of the US House pp. 271-285 W. Mark Crain and John Sullivan Rhetoric and rationality: A study of democratization in the Soviet Union pp. 287-314 Richard Anderson and Bernard Grofman An analysis of voter predictive dimensions and recovery of the underlying issue space pp. 315-334 Tom Tanner Club theory: Thirty years later pp. 335-355 Todd Sandler and John Tschirhart Gerrymandering and the Voting Rights Act of 1982: A public choice analysis of turnover in the U.S. House of Representatives pp. 357-371 Franklin Mixon and Kamal Upadhyaya A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict pp. 373-388 Hugh Neary Self-imposed term limits pp. 389-394 Edward Glaeser The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review pp. 395-426 Jakob de Haan The Bundesbank's path to independence: Evidence from the 1950s pp. 427-453 Helge Berger Cooperative lobbying and endogenous trade policy pp. 455-475 Toke S Aidt Tullock's rent-seeking contest with a minimum expenditure requirement pp. 477-486 Lambert Schoonbeek and Peter Kooreman Who wants the euro – and why? Economic explanations of public attitudes towards a single European currency pp. 487-510 Manfred Gärtner Charles K. Rowley, Willem Thorbecke and Richard E. Wagner, Trade protection in the United States pp. 511-514 Thomas Willett Steven J. Brams and Alan D. Taylor, Fair division: From cake cutting to dispute resolution pp. 514-517 Joe Oppenheimer John M. Carey, Term limits and legislative representation pp. 517-522 Elizabeth Garrett Albert Breton, Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public finance pp. 523-524 James M. Buchanan Roger Middleton, Government versus the market: The growth of the public sector, economic management, and British economic performance, 1890–1979 pp. 525-527 Brian Goff Volume 93, issue 1-2 , 1997
Empirical Evaluation of Bureaucratic Models of Inefficiency pp. 1-18 William Duncombe , Jerry Miner and John Ruggiero Politics and the Pursuit of Fame pp. 19-35 Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter Soviet Venality: A Rent-Seeking Model of the Communist State pp. 37-53 Gary M Anderson and Peter J. Boettke Imperfect Rent Dissipation with Unionized Labor pp. 55-75 Martin Rama Democide and Genocide as Rent-Seeking Activities pp. 77-97 Gerald W Scully Endogenizing the Median Voter: Public Choice Goes to School pp. 99-118 Stephanie Dunne , W. Robert Reed and James Wilbanks Learning the Structure of a Simple Rent-Seeking Game pp. 119-30 Derek J Clark The Strategic Behavior of the Italian Left in a Risk-Sharing Framework pp. 131-48 Pietro Navarra and Diego Lignana Generational Accounting and Intergenerational Welfare pp. 149-63 Bernd Raffelhuschen and Alf Erling Risa Stagflationary Bias and the Interaction of Monetary Policy and Wages in a Unionized Economy pp. 165-78 Robin Cubitt Pressure and the Division of a Public Budget pp. 179-95 Derek J Clark Volume 92, issue 3-4 , 1997
Optimal Effort Allocation by U.S. Senators: The Role of Constituency Size pp. 221-29 Cary M Atlas , Robert J Hendershott and Mark A Zupan Explaining House Voting on the North American Free Trade Agreement pp. 231-42 Willem Thorbecke If You Can't Please Everyone, Must You Only Please Yourself? Personal or Party Ideologies and Senate Roll Call Voting pp. 243-60 Eric M Uslaner An Empirical Test of Neutrality and the Crowding-Out Hypothesis pp. 261-79 Eric J. Brunner On Distinguishing between Leviathan and Public Interest Governments in a Federal State pp. 281-99 Sohrab Abizadeh and Philippe Cyrenne Human Capital, Committee Power and Legislative Outcomes pp. 301-16 Jason Lee Saving Empirical Evidence on a Special-Interest-Group Perspective to Antitrust pp. 317-35 Delorme, Charles D, , W Scott Frame and David R Kamerschen A Market Based Evaluation of the Election versus Appointment of Regulatory Commissioners pp. 337-51 Joseph A Fields , Linda S Klein and James M Sfiridis Learning and Signalling by Advisor Selection pp. 353-67 Wilko A. Letterie and Otto Swank Rent-Seeking and Political Tenure: First Estimates pp. 369-85 Patrick McNutt Opinion Polls and Political Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence for the United States pp. 387-406 Fredrik Carlsen Political Business Cycles and Macroeconomic Credibility: A Survey pp. 407-27 Simon Glover Price Time-Consistent Monetary Policy under Output Persistence pp. 429-37 Manfred Gärtner Volume 92, issue 1-2 , 1997
Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article pp. 1-13 Lott, John R, Donald Wittman's The Myth of Democratic Failure: Review Article pp. 15-26 Charles K Rowley A Multinomial Logit Analysis of the Influence of Policy Variables and Board Experience on FOMC Voting Behavior pp. 27-39 Stuart Douglas Allen , Jeremy Bray and Terry G Seaks Non-redundant Groups, the Assurance Game and the Origins of Collective Action pp. 41-53 Rene Cortazar Congressional Committees and the Political Economy of Federal Outlays pp. 55-73 R Michael Alvarez and Jason Lee Saving The Role of Tax Bases and Collections Costs in the Determination of Income Tax Rates, Seigniorage and Inflation pp. 75-90 Lawrence W. Kenny and Mark Toma Exogenous Tariff Changes with an Endogenous Lobbying Response pp. 91-108 Paul Pecorino Rent Dissipation When Rent Seekers Are Budget Constrained pp. 109-26 Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale A Comparison of Three Institutions for Monetary Policy When Central Bankers Have Private Objectives pp. 127-43 Hans Peter Gruner The Barely Revealed Preference behind Road Investment Priorities pp. 145-68 Lasse Fridstrom and Rune Elvik Voter Information and Power Dilution: Evidence from Sicilian Provincial Elections pp. 169-80 Ram Mudambi , Pietro Navarra and Giuseppe Sobbrio Local Government Grants and Income Tax Revenue: Redistributive Politics in Norway 1900-1990 pp. 181-97 Lars-Erik Borge and Jorn Rattso
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