Information is important to Condorcet jurors

Ruth Ben-Yashar ()

Public Choice, 2006, vol. 127, issue 3, pages 305-319

Abstract: Group decision making is very significant in a broad variety of settings. This paper deals with committees that make binary decisions and addresses the question of whether informative decisions can be assumed within this framework. We show that when using the optimal decision rule, informative decision making is a Nash equilibrium. Thus we justify the assumption of informative decision making and provide support for the relevance of assumptions such as independent decision making, when using the optimal decision rule. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

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