A distributive N-amendment game with endogenous agenda formation

Elizabeth Penn ()

Public Choice, 2008, vol. 136, issue 1, pages 201-213

Keywords: Endogenous agendas; Banks set; Minimax solutions; Endogenous stopping; Divide-the-dollar (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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