Hangin' Ten: The Common-Pool Resource Problem of Surfing

Robert Rider

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 97, issue 1-2, pages 49-64

Abstract: Surfers face a common-pool resource problem, similar to that faced by fishers. Although the ocean shore is a common-pool resource, each wave is a private good. Coordination is essential if a surfers' dilemma is to be avoided. The author's models this situation as a two-person, two stage game. He shows that for many cases the subgame perfect equilibrium is socially optimal. In other cases, the equilibrium is not optimal. The author argues that for these cases a surfers' etiquette has evolved in response to this dilemma. A first-to-the curl, first-in-right rule ameliorates but does not fully resolve the dilemma. In addition, a locals-only policy, a policy in violation of the surfers' etiquette, may be a rational response to a growth of inexperienced surfers on the waves. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998
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