Political instability and growth in dictatorships

Jody Robert Overland (), Kenneth L. Simons and Michael Spagat ()

Public Choice, 2005, vol. 125, issue 3, pages 445-470

Abstract: We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous probability of “political catastrophe'' that would extinguish the regime's wealth extraction ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic capital the dictator plunders the country's resources and the economy shrinks. With high initial domestic capital the economy eventually grows faster than is socially optimal. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2005

Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships (2003)
Working Paper: Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships (2000)
Working Paper: Political Instability and Growth in Dictatorships (2000)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:125:y:2005:i:3:p:445-470

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