Democratic institutions versus autocratic regimes: The case of environmental policy

Per G. Fredriksson () and Jim Wollscheid ()

Public Choice, 2007, vol. 130, issue 3, pages 381-393

Abstract: The literature suggests that democracy positively affects environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we find that this result appears to be largely driven by the parliamentary democracies (as opposed to the presidential-congressional, proportional or majority systems). Moreover, it appears that presidential-congressional systems often set environmental policies not significantly different from autocracies. These are novel contributions to the literature. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Political institutions; Democracy; Environmental policy; Propensity score matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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