Corruption, federalism, and policy formation in the OECD: the case of energy policy

Per G. Fredriksson () and Herman R.J. Vollebergh ()

Public Choice, 2009, vol. 140, issue 1, pages 205-221

Keywords: Corruption; Institutions; Federalism; Political economy; Energy efficiency; Q48; D73; D78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-009-9419-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:140:y:2009:i:1:p:205-221

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is edited by Charles K. Rowley, WIlliam F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().