Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence

Oleg Smirnov ()

Public Choice, 2009, vol. 141, issue 3, pages 277-290

Keywords: Endogenous agenda; Amendment agenda; Strategic voting; Intransivity of collective preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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