Governance as a strategy in state-of-nature games

Jason Briggeman ()

Public Choice, 2009, vol. 141, issue 3, pages 481-491

Keywords: Governance; Coercion; Prisoners’ Dilemma; Game theory; Thomas Hobbes; State of nature; Anarchy; Public choice; C72; D7; H1; H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

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