Ideology, Voting, and Shirking

James B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin ()

Public Choice, 1993, vol. 76, issue 1-2, pages 151-72

Abstract: Since the authors first raised the issue in 1979, scholars have addressed two questions regarding ideology and congressional voting. Does ideology have an impact on such voting? Do representatives shirk by voting their own ideology rather than their constituents' interests? For the first question, it appears that there is a consensus that ideology does matter, although they present some confirming evidence for 1980. The second question has been confused; some think that ideology and shirking are identical, although they are logically separate categories. The authors show that even if ideological shirking exists, it is relatively unimportant. They also show that self interested (non-ideological) shirking exists. They conclude that research efforts to untangle constituents' and representatives' separate ideologies have been misguided and that further efforts to examine the determinants of constituent ideology should be pursued. Copyright 1993 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:76:y:1993:i:1-2:p:151-72

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