Social Order through Constitutional Choice: A Contractarian Proposal

Niclas Berggren ()

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 89, issue 3-4, pages 339-61

Abstract: The present paper consists of two closely related parts: one which outlines a normative criterion for evaluating the legitimacy of constitutional change and one which specifies a particular proposal of a constitution. The criterion used stems directly from the 'pragmatic' brand of contractarianism developed by Buchanan, where an approximate rule of unanimity is utilized. The proposal aims at the highest possible freedom of choice for individuals when it comes to defining the political system of their liking: a core (dealing with public goods and rights) is common for all but everything else can vary between different subconstitutions between which individuals choose. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:89:y:1996:i:3-4:p:339-61

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