Expressive voting and electoral equilibrium

Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 95, issue 1, pages 149-175

Abstract: There are two rival accounts of rational voting in the public choice tradition: the mainstream instrumental account, that sees the vote as a revelation of preference over possible electoral outcomes, essentially analogous to a market choice; and the expressive account, that sees the vote as expressing support for one or other electoral options, rather like cheering at a football match. This paper attempts to lay out some of the implications of the expressive account of voting for the issue of who votes as well as for the nature of political equilibrium, and to compare these implications with those derived from the instrumental account. We also identify and discuss the alternative views of the domain of electoral politics associated with the instrumental and expressive accounts of voting, and sketch a route towards the integration of expressive and instrumental ideas in the analysis of rational electoral politics. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1004936203144 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Expressive Voting and Electoral Equilibrium (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:95:y:1998:i:1:p:149-175

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is edited by Charles K. Rowley, WIlliam F. Shughart and Robert D. Tollison

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().