The Private Provision of Public Goods via Dominant Assurance Contracts

Alexander Tabarrok ()

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 96, issue 3-4, pages 345-62

Abstract: Many types of public goods can be produced privately by profit-seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance contract, called a dominant assurance contract. The author models the dominant assurance contract as a game and shows that the pure strategy equilibrium has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The game is also modeled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash game. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998

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