On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs

Anna Alberini and David H. Austin ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1999, vol. 15, issue 1, pages 41-63

Abstract: We test a model of states' adoption of the hazardous waste liability regime (negligence, strict liability) providing greater net benefits. The likelihood of adopting strict liability increases in a state's number of chemical-intensive manufacturing plants, decreases in the number of large mining establishments. Also predictive: severity of state's hazardous waste problem, effectiveness of other state environmental programs, and political climate. States may view strict liability as better for industrial than mining pollution, and may be partly motivated by "precaution targeting" and "deep pockets" mentality. Non-adopters may wish not to discourage business or have other programs that substitute for strict liability. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
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Working Paper: On and Off the Liability Bandwagon: Explaining State Adoptions of Strict Liability in Hazardous Waste Programs (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:15:y:1999:i:1:p:41-63

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