Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints
Tommaso Valletti (),
Steffen Hoernig () and
Pedro Barros ()
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, vol. 21, issue 2, 169-90
Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to achieve universal service objectives under competition. We intend to fill this gap, and disaggregate the problem into interacting forms of regulatory intervention such as uniform pricing and coverage constraints. It is shown that these are not competitively neutral and may have far-reaching strategic effects. Under uniform pricing, equilibrium coverage of both incumbent and entrant may be lower than without regulation. These effects depend on which measures are imposed at the same time, thus no single measure can be evaluated in isolation. We also point out that different groups of consumers are affected in different ways, making welfare comparisons difficult. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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