Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector

Billette de Villemeur, Etienne, et al
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Etienne Billette de Villemeur ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2003, vol. 24, issue 1, pages 49-62

Abstract: This paper studies the optimal price structure in the postal sector when worksharing is available (e.g., for collection, sorting and transportation) and when the operator faces a break-even constraint. Users differ in opportunity and cost to engage in worksharing. We determine the optimal worksharing discount and provide sufficient conditions (on demand functions) under which it exceeds the ECPR level. Furthermore, we show that the optimal prices can be implemented through a global price cap imposed on a weighted average of the prices of all products. The appropriate weights are proportional to the market demand (evaluated at optimal prices) of the corresponding products. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003
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