Entry and Exchanges of Cost Information

Olivier Armantier and Oliver Richard

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2003, vol. 24, issue 2, pages 223-41

Abstract: The literature on exchanges of information has ignored firms' entry decisions. Yet, the Federal Trade Commission recently expressed concerns that exchanges of information in business-to-business electronic platforms would adversely impact entry and, thus, consumers. When entry decisions are endogenized in a competitive Cournot model with cost uncertainty, we find results that contrast sharply with current thinking on the welfare consequences of information sharing. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2003

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