Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information

Mark Armstrong () and David E. M. Sappington

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2004, vol. 26, issue 1, pages 5-21

Abstract: We develop a simple, yet general, model that admits as special cases several key analyses of the design of regulatory policy in the presence of asymmetric information. In doing so, we help to identify the central differences and similarities among the diverse analyses in the literature.

Date: 2004

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:26:y:2004:i:1:p:5-21

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is edited by Michael A. Crew

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().