Incentive Regulation and Telecommunications Service Quality

Chunrong Ai, Salvador Martinez () and David E. M. Sappington

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2004, vol. 26, issue 3, pages 263-285

Abstract: We examine the impact of incentive regulation—price regulation and earnings sharing regulation—on retail service quality in the U.S. telecommunications industry between 1991 and 2002. We find that incentive regulation is associated with significantly higher service quality on several dimensions (e.g., more rapid installation of new telephone service, fewer trouble reports, and increased customer satisfaction) but significantly lower quality on some dimensions (fewer installation commitments met and longer delays in resolving reported service problems) Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2004

Keywords: service quality; incentive regulation; telecommunications (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-004-7551-6 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:26:y:2004:i:3:p:263-285

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is edited by Michael A. Crew

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().