Worksharing, access and bypass: the structure of prices in the postal sector

Etienne Billette de Villemeur (), Helmuth Cremer (), Bernard Roy and Joëlle Toledano

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2007, vol. 32, issue 1, pages 67-85

Abstract: This paper studies a liberalized postal market where entrants may offer end-to-end products or concentrate on one of the segments of the network. Absent effective bypass, entry does not appear to be a serious financial threat to the incumbent, even when the products are perfect substitutes. This is no longer true when the entrant offers cheaper service in delivery. Then, the universal service provider may loose the entire pre-sorted mail market. It is left with probably low volume demand from households and from firms with high preparation cost, and its financial viability may be jeopardized. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: Postal sector; Liberalization; Universal service; Access; Bypass; L51; L87; L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: Worksharing, Access and Bypass: The Structure of Prices in the Postal Sector (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:32:y:2007:i:1:p:67-85

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