Regulatory Regimes in the Electric Power Industry: Implications for Capacity

Esther Gal-Or () and Michael H Spiro

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1992, vol. 4, issue 3, pages 263-78

Abstract: The authors construct a model of the electric power industry which consists of two utilities faced with uncertain demand and a variety of regulatory regimes. Two technologies are considered, base-load and peaking, and the transfer of bulk electricity among utilities is permitted. The purpose of the paper is not to determine optimal regulatory regimes but to provide a framework for analyzing existing and contemplated regulatory initiatives. The conclusions are that long run survival mandates an authorized rate of return above the cost of capital and that excess investment will result. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that current regulatory instruments such as "Used and Useful," distribution of profits from bulk sales, and pricing of wholesale electricity can lead to a socially optimal capital stock. Copyright 1992 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:4:y:1992:i:3:p:263-78

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