Contractual nullification of economically-detrimental state-made laws

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2006, vol. 19, issue 2, pages 149-187

Abstract: An economy may remain robust in the face of efficiency-inhibiting state-made rules if individuals are able to establish effective sources of credibility that do not rely on the state. After explaining how non-state sources of trust and private recourse evolve to enhance credibility, examples of contracting around undesirable rules in United States are discussed. The potential for contractual nullification varies considerably, however, in part because of state action that limits civil-society and/or market activities. In many less robust economies, there are even more significant barriers to building private sources of trust and recourse, undermining the potential for contractual nullification. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: ADR; Contractual nullification; Credibility; Customary law; Private recourse; Reputation; Trust (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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