Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2006, vol. 19, issue 2, pages 203-215

Abstract: The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: Antitrust; Knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)

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