Politics, selection and the public interest: Besley’s benevolent despot

Geoffrey Brennan

The Review of Austrian Economics, 2009, vol. 22, issue 2, pages 131-143

Keywords: Benevolent despot; Selection; Principal–agent; Public economics and public choice; H11; D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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