Marriage migration: just another case of positive assortative matching?

Aycan Celikaksoy, Helena Skyt Nielsen () and Mette Verner ()

Review of Economics of the Household, 2006, vol. 4, issue 3, pages 253-275

Abstract: It is a stylized fact that marriage formation involves positive assortative matching on education. We also find this in the case of immigrants, even when they tend to “import” their spouses and potentially trade off education for other favorable characteristics. For Pakistanis, we find positive compensating differentials in terms of high education to youth having adopted host country norms, when marrying a marriage migrant. This indicates that Pakistani marriage migrants pay a premium to be able to marry and live in Denmark. For Turks, individuals having source country norms pay a premium in order to import a partner, indicating that unspoiled traditional norms are traded off for education. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

Keywords: Assortative matching; Homogamy; Exchange theory; Compensating differentials; Marriage migration; J12; J15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Marriage Migration: Just another case of positive assortative matching? (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:reveho:v:4:y:2006:i:3:p:253-275

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