Fine-Tailored for the Cartel-Favoritism in Procurement

Ariane Lambert-Mogiliansky () and Grigory Kosenok ()

Review of Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 35, issue 1, pages 95-121

Keywords: Auction; Collusion; Favoritism; Procurement; D44; D73; H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11151-009-9220-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:revind:v:35:y:2009:i:1:p:95-121

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Industrial Organization is edited by L.J. White

More articles in Review of Industrial Organization from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().