A recursive core for partition function form games

László Kóczy ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: László Á. Kóczy ()

Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 41-51

Abstract: We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: core; externalities; optimism; partition function; pessimism (search for similar items in EconPapers)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-007-9030-x (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: A recursive core for partition function form games (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this article

Theory and Decision is edited by Bertrand R. Munier

More articles in Theory and Decision from Springer
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().