On Robust Constitution Design

Emmanuelle Auriol () and Robert Jean Michel Gary-Bobo ()

Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 62, issue 3, pages 241-279

Abstract: We study a class of representation mechanisms, based on reports made by a random subset of agents, called representatives, in a collective choice problem with quasi-linear utilities. We do not assume the existence of a common prior probability describing the distribution of preference types. In addition, there is no benevolent planner. Decisions will be carried out by an individual who cannot be assumed impartial, a self-interested executive. These assumptions impose new constraints on Mechanism Design. A robust mechanism is defined as maximizing expected welfare under a vague prior probability distribution, and over a set of mechanisms which is at the same time immune from opportunistic manipulations by the executive, and compatible with truthful revelation of preferences by representatives. Robust mechanisms are characterized and their existence is shown. Sampling Groves mechanisms are shown to be robust. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: collective choice; incomplete information; mechanism design; representative democracy; D7; D8; H0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Robust Constitution Design (2002)
Working Paper: On Robust Constitution Design (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:theord:v:62:y:2007:i:3:p:241-279

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