A recursive core for partition function form games

László Kóczy ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: László Á. Kóczy ()

Theory and Decision, 2007, vol. 63, issue 1, pages 41-51

Abstract: We present a well-defined generalisation of the core to coalitional games with externalities, where the value of a deviation is given by an endogenous response, the solution (if nonempty: the core) of the residual game. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Keywords: core; externalities; optimism; partition function; pessimism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Working Paper: A recursive core for partition function form games (2006)
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