Multiple Equilibria in Markets with Screening

Alexis Direr ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2008, vol. 40, issue 4, pages 791-798

Abstract: This paper adds endogenous screening to Broecker (1990) and shows the possibility of multiple screening equilibria. A high intensity of screening by a bank decreases average quality of firms applying to other banks, which in turn have further incentives to screen. The link between the degree of concentration of the banking industry and the extension of credit is also discussed. Copyright (c) 2008 The Ohio State University.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2008.00136.x link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking is edited by Pok-Sang Lam, Deborah Lucas, Masao Ogaki and Kenneth D. West

More articles in Journal of Money, Credit and Banking from Blackwell Publishing
Series data maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().