Central Bank Design in General Equilibrium

James Bullard and Christopher Waller ()

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2004, vol. 36, issue 1, pages 95-113

Abstract: We study the effects of alternative institutional arrangements for the determination of monetary policy in the context of a capital-theoretic, general equilibrium economy. We consider three institutional arrangements for determining monetary policy. The first, unconditional majority voting, always leads to a substantial inflation bias. The second, a simple form of bargaining which we interpret as a policy board, generally improves on the unconditional majority voting outcome. Finally, we consider a constitutional rule which always achieves the social optimum.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Central bank design in general equilibrium (2002)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:36:y:2004:i:1:p:95-113

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