Outsiders at the Bank of England's MPC

Petra Gerlach-Kristen

Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2009, vol. 41, issue 6, pages 1099-1115

Abstract: The monetary policy committee (MPC) of the Bank of England consists of five internal and four external members. We study the voting record and show that outsiders dissent more often than insiders and tend to prefer lower rates, especially during economic downturns. Moreover, dissents by outsiders help forecast future interest rate changes, in contrast to dissents by insiders. A model in which outsiders in contrast to insiders are "recession averse" and more uncertain regarding the appropriate level of interest rates replicates the observed voting pattern well. Copyright (c) 2009 The Ohio State University.

Date: 2009

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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcb:jmoncb:v:41:y:2009:i:6:p:1099-1115

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