Member States Liability for Infringement of the Free Movement of Goods in the EC: An Economic Analysis

Roger Van Den Bergh and Hans-Bernd Schäfer

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2000, vol. 156, issue 2, pages 382-

Abstract: In several landmark cases, the European Court of Justice has ruled that member states of the European Union are liable for damages caused by an infringement of European Law if the violation is sufficiently serious. This article analyses the incentive effects of liability rules on member states to avoid discriminatory trade-related regulation under the disguise of consumer, environmental or health protection. These results of the analysis are ambiguous. A rule which automatically triggers liability, in case of a breach of European Law, might lead to over- or under-compliance. Some arguments in favour of liability for obvious misconduct are presented.

JEL-codes: K3 L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is edited by Elmar Wolfstetter and Dominique Demougin

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Series data maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().