Yes-Men and No-Men: Does Defiance Signal Talent?Jeong-Yoo Kim and Keunkwan Ryu Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2003, vol. 159, issue 3, pages 468- Abstract: We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others believe that he is able in the sense that his information is accurate. We demonstrate that disobedience can signal high ability in an equilibrium. JEL-codes: D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is edited by Elmar Wolfstetter and Dominique Demougin More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen |
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