State Liability for Wrongful Conviction: Incentive Effects on Crime Levels

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2007, vol. 163, issue 2, pages 269-284

Abstract: Wrongful convictions may increase the level of crime over the ideal case of their absence. The problem of wrongful conviction is most serious in areas where crime is endemic and for certain groups of citizens who are stereotyped. State liability mitigates this problem; compensating the wrongfully convicted induces some individuals not to commit crimes, thereby leading to a lower crime level. However, state liability may distort the behavior of judges if the welfare of judges is inversely related to compensation for wrongful conviction. We address policy implications that minimize such distortions.

JEL-codes: K10 K13 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2007/00000163/00000002/art00004 (text/html)
Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Mohr Siebeck GmbH & Co. KG, P.O.Box 2040, 72010 Tübingen, Germany

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) is edited by Elmar Wolfstetter and Dominique Demougin

More articles in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) from Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen
Series data maintained by Thomas Wolpert ().