On the Coevolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis

Werner Güth, Hartmut Kliemt, Maria Vittoria Levati () and Georg von Wangenheim

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2007, vol. 163, issue 1, pages 143-157

Abstract: Standard economic explanations of good conduct in trade rely almost exclusively on future-directed extrinsic motivations induced by material incentives. But intrinsic motives to behave trustworthily and to punish untrustworthiness do support trade. In our model, intrinsically motivated players are aware of their own type and observe the population share of other types. The material success of various types and their coevolution are analyzed, and it is checked whether the dynamics of the indirect evolutionary analysis are replicated in the laboratory.

JEL-codes: B52 C72 C90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007

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Working Paper: On the Co-evolution of Retribution and Trustworthiness: An (Indirect) Evolutionary and Experimental Analysis (2006)
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