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Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms
Amrish Patel ()
Edward John Cartwright , 2012, vol. 168, issue 2, pages 280-289
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) Abstract:
In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.
JEL-codes: D82 D83 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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