Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms

Amrish Patel () and Edward John Cartwright ()

Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), 2012, vol. 168, issue 2, pages 280-289

Abstract: In a signalling model of conformity, we demonstrate that naïve observers, those that take actions at face value, constrain the set of actions that can possibly be social norms. With rational observers many actions can be norms, but with naïve observers only actions close to that preferred by the ideal type can be norms. We suggest, therefore, that the naïvety or inexperience of observers is an important determinant of norms and how they evolve.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Working Paper: Naïve Beliefs and the Multiplicity of Social Norms (2011)
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