Abstract:
In this article, I provide a rationale for nuisance suits. I show that a plaintiff may file a nuisance suit if he expects that his suit may induce suits by other plaintiffs. If an initial plaintiff is too pessimistic about this possibility, a nuisance suit may not be filed even though it would be meritorious with joinder with another plaintiff. In this case, lawyers may play the role of reducing such coordination failure due to asymmetric information by providing potential plaintiffs with relevant information. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
Date: 2004
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American Law and Economics Review is edited by Hon. Richard A. Posner
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