Protecting Homemakers' Marriage-Specific Investments under No-Fault Divorce: A Model for Restructuring Alimony in Civil Law Countries

Aspasia Tsaoussis

American Law and Economics Review, 2004, vol. 6, issue 1, pages 217-247

Abstract: The radical reform of Greek family law in 1983 included the introduction of no-fault divorce. This study examines the impact of the new liberalized divorce law on the well-being of homemakers in long-duration traditional marriages. We reviewed a sample of reported judicial decisions on postdivorce maintenance and found that Greek judges render restrictive interpretations of the general standards of need, adequacy, and sufficiency. We conclude that judges have failed to compensate full-time homemakers for their nonpecuniary contributions, and we propose a reliance-based alimony model that judges can use to protect financially weaker spouses upon divorce. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.

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