Abstract:
This article looks at the effect that pretrial, statutorily required screening panels in Nevada have had on medical malpractice litigation. I use two unique data sets on litigation in Nevada and neighboring states from 1983--88, during which the Nevada legislature enacted screening panels. Applying time-series and difference-in-difference analyses, I show that observed decreases in Nevada with respect to damage awards, attorney's fees, and duration in litigation reflected a broader secular trend. The panels did, however, reduce the relative probability of claims requiring resolution by the Nevada courts. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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American Law and Economics Review is edited by Hon. Richard A. Posner
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