Abstract:
Only in 1931 was the California Corporate Code revised to provide for limited liability. In earlier work I found that this move had no detectable effect on shareholder wealth. In this article I examine the potential beneficiaries of this change with an eye toward finding out who wanted this change. Using this historical example we can shed light on a number of issues including: (1) the economic impact of limited liability; (2) the role of lawyers, especially lawyers of high prestige, in determining the law; and (3) the competition or lack thereof among states in designing their corporate codes. Copyright 2005, Oxford University Press.
American Law and Economics Review is edited by Hon. Richard A. Posner
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