Keynes's Critiques of Moore: Philosophical Foundations of Keynes's Economics

Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1991, vol. 15, issue 1, pages 61-77

Abstract: This paper analyzes three of John Maynard Keynes's unpublished apostles papers, "Ethics in Relation to Conduct," "Miscellanea Ethica," and "Egoism," and the philosophical discussion in the first chapters of the Treatise on Probability. It argues that Keynes's philosophical development before and in the Treatise can be understood as an effort to make sense of the concept of intuition. Specifically, it is argued that Keynes abandoned a two-fold view of intuition in the early papers for a two-tier epistimology of acquaintance and knowledge in the Treatise, only to return to the two-fold view later in The General Theory. Copyright 1991 by Oxford University Press.

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